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ARTICLES
CONFLICTING VISTAS IN THE NATION'S
CAPITAL: THE CASE OF THE WORLD
TECHNOLOGY TRADE CENTER
Charles W. Harris*
and Neeka Harris**
Canadian political scientist Donald C. Rowat asserts that determining
how to rule the national capital is a difficult task facing every country with a
federal system of government. This difficulty, according to Rowat, results
from the fact that "there is always a conflict of interests between the national
government and the people who live in the capital city."' The primary con-
cern of the national government is to manage the capital in the interests of
the entire nation, while the city's inhabitants "naturally wish to govern
themselves to the greatest extent possible." 2 What is possible usually is de-
termined on the basis of the constitutional rights and privileges enjoyed by
the citizens of the nation as a whole.
In addition, Rowat asserts that governance of a federal capital poses a
problem inherent in federalism. If any one state in the union governs the
national capital, that state could possibly dominate the federation's capital,
denying the central government adequate control.3 Rowat directs his latter
assertion mainly at his own country, Canada, where the national capital in
* Associate Dean and Professor of Political Science, College of Liberal Arts, Howard
University. Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1959; M.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1950;
A.B., Morehouse College, 1949. This Article was written while Professor Harris was Guest
Scholar in the Governmental Studies Program at The Brookings Institution, 1987-88. He also
served as Senior Specialist and Chief, Government Division, Congressional Research Service,
1971-74 and Associate Director, Executive Institutes, U.S. Civil Service Commission, 1966-67.
** J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1986; A.B., Yale, 1981.
The authors wish to thank R. Kent Weaver, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, for
detailed and stimulating comments on an earlier version of this Article. Ed Meyers, Charles
0. Jones, Joe White, and Greg Lewis also read earlier drafts and made very helpful sugges-
tions. This research was assisted by an award from the Faculty Research Program in the
Social Sciences, Humanities, and Education at Howard University.
1. D. ROWAT, THE GOVERNMENT OF FEDERAL CAPITALS xi (1973).
2. Id.
3. Id.
Catholic University Law Review
Ottawa is under the exclusive control of the local legislature of Ontario prov-
ince.' The alternative arrangement is to designate the capital as a federal
district or territory under the exclusive jurisdiction of the central govern-
ment. Rowat cites the District of Columbia (District) as an example of this
latter principle.'
Although the United States does not face the problem Rowat identifies
concerning domination of the National Capital by one of its states, Rowat's
central "conflict of interests" thesis applies in all federal countries, particu-
larly the United States.6 Despite efforts in the United States to present the
governmental arrangement in the nation's Capital as a smooth working
"partnership," conflicts remain between the national and local governments.
The United States is still in search of a system of governance for the District
of Columbia that will be satisfactory to the nation as a whole and, at the
same time, will provide local citizens with the full democratic rights and
privileges to which they are entitled under the United States Constitution.
The fundamental problem in addressing conflicts of interest in capital cit-
ies is one of defining federal and local interests. In more than fourteen years
of home rule government in the District of Columbia, policymakers have
approached this question largely on an individual case basis, relying on com-
mon judgment and reason. Neither national nor local government is com-
pletely satisfied with the present arrangement and at times each must go to
court to settle their differences. Problems continue to arise that require a
better and more precise response to the question of defining federal and local
interests.
Obviously, some public policy issues generate more controversy than
others. This Article examines conflicting Federal and local interests that
arose within the context of construction of a trade center in the District of
Columbia. This project precipitated a conflict between Federal and local
interests centered on land use policy and procedures in the District of Co-
lumbia. Control over land use policy may represent the most fundamental
attribute of an autonomous local government. The battle for control be-
tween the Federal Government and the government of the District of Co-
lumbia over this domain took shape in the post-home rule era. Significantly,
one of the few times Congress used its veto power to invalidate an enactment
of the District of Columbia City Council concerned a bill pertaining to land
use policy.7
4. Id. at xii, 315.
5. Id. at xii.
6. Id. at xi-xii.
7. District Council Act No. 3-120, The Location of Chanceries Amendment Act of 1979.
was rejected by Congress on December 20, 1979. S. Con. Res. 63, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
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Another visible skirmish between Federal and local interests in the post-
home rule period occurred during the approval of the World Technology
Trade Center for High Technology and Information Industries (Techworld).
Currently, Techworld is nearing completion at a downtown Washington site.
The conflict that raged during the project's approval process consumed more
time than was originally projected for the first stages of construction.
The Techworld saga is an important part of the history of the nation's
Capital and has special significance for the post-home rule period. First, the
case makes an important contribution toward "fleshing out" the skeletal de-
sign of Federal and local interest balancing created by the District of Colum-
bia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule
Act or Act). 8 It also provides an ideal case study for examining Donald C.
Rowat's theory on the conflict of governments' interests in federal capital
cities.
This Article presents a case study of the Techworld development designed
to take issue with or refine Rowat's conflict of interest theory. The study
qualitatively examines national and local interests as interpreted and articu-
lated by official and unofficial representatives of various branches of the
United States and District of Columbia governments. Sources include a va-
riety of legal and judicial documents, newspaper accounts, reports, general
government documents, and in-depth consultations with persons involved in
the controversy. The general reference period for this Article begins with
the commencement of home rule in the District of Columbia in 1975 and
continues until the present.
I. THE PLANNING AND ZONING PROVISIONS OF THE HOME RULE ACT:
A REVIEW OF How THEY CAME TO BE
The Techworld controversy, centering on the comprehensive planning
process in the District of Columbia, to some extent, recast some familiar
home rule issues first debated in Congress and at the local level during pas-
sage of the Home Rule Act in 1973. In order to adequately analyze this
controversy, it is necessary to briefly review how the current planning and
zoning powers developed in the Home Rule Act.
CONG. REC. 36,138 (1979). For a description of Congress' veto power over District of Colum-
bia (District) government enactments, see infra notes 107 and 212.
8. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of I D.C. Cow:
ANN. (Replacement Volume 1987)).
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A. Public Opinion and Participation in the Home Rule Debate
Congress clearly wrestled with the issue of delegating comprehensive plan-
ning authority in the District when it considered home rule legislation in
1973. It faced the question of whether this authority should remain at the
Federal level in the hands of the National Capital Planning Commission
(NCPC or Commission),9 or should be transferred to the local level and
vested in the Mayor and the City Council. Federal and local leaders strenu-
ously debated local planning and zoning issues both during the passage of
home rule legislation and ten years later during the Techworld planning pro-
cess. Although most of the personalities changed, the focal point of the de-
bate remained the same: Should federal or local authorities determine land
use policy for the District of Columbia?
In 1972, the Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Gov-
ernment of the District of Columbia (the Nelsen Commission) emphasized
the issue of who should handle local comprehensive planning. 1O Generally,
the recommendations of the Nelsen Commission reflected a desire to:
(1) strengthen the role of the NCPC as the principal planning agency for the
Federal Government in the District and in the National Capital region as a
whole; (2) permit the District government to undertake comprehensive phys-
ical, social, economic, and transportation planning reflecting the needs of
residents and the business community; and (3) create an ongoing system of
9. In 1924, Congress created the National Capital Park Commission, a predecessor to
the current National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC or Commission). Act of June 6,
1924, ch. 270, 43 Stat. 463. In so doing, Congress proposed to facilitate the "comprehensive[,]
systematic, and continuous development of [Rock Creek Park] and playground system of the
National Capital ...." Id. Twenty-eight years later, in the National Capital Planning Act of
1952, Congress designated the NCPC as "the central planning agency for the Federal and
District Governments to plan the appropriate and orderly development .. .of the National
Capital and the conservation of the important natural and historical features thereof." Na-
tional Capital Planning Act, Pub. L. No. 82-592, § 2, 66 Stat. 781, 782 (1952) (codified as
amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 71-71h (1982) and at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2001 to 1-2007 (Re-
placement Volume 1987)). The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Re-
organization Act (Home Rule Act or Act) limited the NCPC's function by designating it the
"central Federal planning agency for the Federal Government in the National Capital ...."
Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 203(a), 87 Stat. 774, 780 (1973) (codified at 40 U.S.C.
§ 71a(a)(1) (1982) and D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2002(a)(1)); see also HOUSE COMM. ON DIST. OF
COLUMBIA, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., HOME RULE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1973-1974,
BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 160-62 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter HOME
RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
10. H.R. Doc. No. 317, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-27 (1972) [hereinafter I NL SEN COM-
MISSION REPORT]. The Nelsen Commission, also known as the "Little Hoover Commission,"
completed its comprehensive study and report on the organization of the District of Columbia
government on March 22, 1972. It was established by Congress "to determine ways to pro-
mote economy, efficiency, and improved services for the District government." Id. at xv.
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coordination and "checks and balances" between Federal and local
interests. 1 1
The Nelsen Commission identified fragmentation and a lack of coordina-
tion among agencies with planning responsibilities in the District as serious
obstacles to effective local government.' 2 Furthermore, even though the
NCPC played a major role in comprehensive planning, it could not affect
local planning because it was not a part of the District government. Com-
pounding this problem was the fact that the District had no central planning
authority of its own.' 3 The lack of a clear enabling statute delegating plan-
ning authority exacerbated communication problems between the District
government and outside agencies.' 4
The Nelsen Commission recommended that comprehensive planning au-
thority for the city be moved from the NCPC to a municipal planning office
under the auspices of the Mayor and the City Council.' 5 Under this plan,
the NCPC would remain solely responsible for Federal planning in the Dis-
trict while retaining veto power over local plans that impinged on Federal
interests.
Congress subsequently enacted home rule legislation that adopted the ma-
jor recommendations of the Nelsen Commission with respect to planning in
the District.' 6 The planning provisions of the bill required coordination of
Federal and local planning efforts.' 7 Under the Home Rule Act, after adop-
tion at the respective levels, local and Federal plans would be combined into
a single comprehensive plan. Furthermore, it provided that zoning actions
could not be inconsistent with this plan.' 8
With the endorsement of the Nixon administration, the home rule bill
began progressing through Congress during the summer of 1973.'9 Those
11. 1 NELSEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10.
12. Id. at 24-25.
13. Id.; see also Statement on the Planning, Zoning and Development Provisions, The
District of Columbia Self-Government and Reorganization Act, H.R. 9682 (available at the
Martin Luther King Memorial Library, Washingtoniana Division).
14. See, e.g., I NELSEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10. See also Self-Determination
Legal Research Committee, Nelsen Commission Recommendations as They Relate to the Is-
sue of Self Determination (1973) (available at the Martin Luther King Memorial Library.
Washingtoniana Division).
15. 1 NELSEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 25; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § I-
245 (Replacement Volume 1987); id. § 1-2002 (1981).
16. 1 NELSEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 26-27; see also D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 1-2003, 1-245 to 1-246 (Replacement Volume 1987).
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-244(a) (Replacement Volume 1987).
18. Id. § 5-414 (Replacement Volume 1988). See Canty, For More Responsive Planning
I Wash. Star-News, July 15, 1973, at Cl, col. 1.
19. HOME RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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interested in the legislation stepped up their efforts to influence its final sub-
stance. Citizens groups representing both sides of the controversy joined the
debate over local comprehensive planning. The critical dispute between the
various groups with regard to the planning provisions of the bill continued
to center on whether the power to direct comprehensive planning in the Dis-
trict should remain with the Federal Government or should be shifted, to-
tally or in part, to the new home rule government. To a lesser extent,
congressional debate reflected this schism.2" It was more or less accepted
that the planning for Federal lands and projects would remain with the Na-
tional Government.2 '
The Committee of 100 on the Federal City (Committee of 100) and the
Wisconsin Avenue Corridor Committee (WACC), citizen's groups composed
primarily of residents of far northwest Washington, D.C., were outspoken
advocates of retaining Federal control over all planning within the Dis-
22trict. 2 The Coalition for Self Determination for the District of Columbia,
another citizen's group, worked closely with Mayor Walter Washington and
the District government, and urged Congress to give control of local com-
prehensive planning to the home rule government.23 Mayor Washington
and citizen's groups supporting local control of planning argued that home
rule would be undermined if control over land use and community develop-
ment did not pass to the city government. 24
The Wisconsin Avenue Corridor Committee took strong exception to the
provisions of the home rule bill that transferred local planning power from
the NCPC to the local government. It argued that the transfer of municipal
planning authority to the local government was "inherently destructive of
sound, responsive planning."'25 The fact that the NCPC retained veto power
20. Id. at 3012.
21. Id. Under both the House and Senate proposals, the NCPC would remain as the
central Federal planning agency.
22. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 31,733-34 (1973) (letter from John P. Barry, Chairman,
Wisconsin Avenue Corridor Committee, to Rep. Carl B. Albert, inserted in remarks of Rep.
Ancher Nelsen), reprinted in HOME RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 9, at 1700-01;
Self Determination for the District of Columbia and Report of the Commission on the Organiza-
tion of the Government of the District of Columbia: Hearings Before the Subcomm. oil Govern-
ment Operations of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 230-39
(1973) (statement of Peter S. Craig, Trustee, Committee of 100 on the Federal City) [hereinaf-
ter Craig Statement].
23. Coalition for Self-Determination for D.C., Summary of Position With Respect to Lo-
cal Planning Aspects of Pending Home Rule Legislation (June 12, 1973) (available at Martin
Luther King Memorial Library, Washingtoniana Collection, Home Rule Papers, File I-S).
24. Id.
25. 119 CONG. REC. 31,733-34 (1973) (letter from John P. Barry, Chairman, Wisconsin
Avenue Corridor Committee, to Rep. Carl B. Albert, inserted in remarks of Rep. Ancher
Nelsen), reprinted in HOME RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 9, at 1700-01.
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over local plans that impinged upon Federal interests mattered little to the
WACC and other opponents of local control. In response to the veto provi-
sion, the WACC pointed out that: "[W]e have seen that the system of rely-
ing on veto alone . ..produces inaction, stalemate, and escalating costs
through continual revision of finished plans."26 This group had little faith in
the Mayor as the architect of planning documents. The WACC charged that
pressures on the Mayor and other city officials to augment the city's tax base
made "rational long range planning a complete impossibility.",2
7
The comments by the WACC also reflected the intensity of the struggle
over planning issues. Among other things, the organization's leadership
cited the "grievously deficient" legislation granting some measure of plan-
ning oversight to the local government. 28 Abrasive remarks on the Senate
floor and in committee testimony illustrated the acrimony of the home rule
debate.29
Significantly, one of the groups that voiced concern over the planning au-
thority in 1973, the Committee of 100 on the Federal City,3" also later be-
came embroiled in the Techworld controversy. The Committee of 100 took
a less combative position than WACC, but clearly favored Federal control of
all planning in the Federal District.3" It quickly disposed of the notion that
a satisfactory sharing plan could be worked out by stating: "There was no
logical Federal-District division.",32 It uncompromisingly held to the posi-
tion that a single agency should plan for the entire District of Columbia:
"federal" as well as "district;" public as well as private. 33
Both of the city's major newspapers, The Washington Post and The Wash-
ington Star-News, favored local control of the non-Federal aspects of com-
prehensive planning for the District of Columbia. A Washington Post
26. HOME RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 9, at 1701.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Senator Humphrey recalled Sterling Tucker's testimony before the House District of
Columbia Committee that compared the hypocrisy of the Federal Government's withholding
democracy from the District to a car salesman's selling one make of a car while driving an-
other. 119 CONG. REC. 22,965 (1973). Mayor Walter Washington, in testimony before the
House District of Columbia Committee stated: "[I]f these people fear what an elected govern-
ment will do, they should go all the way and come out against self-determination for the city."
Canty, supra note 18, at Cl, col. 4.
30. HOME RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 9, at 441-42; see also infra notes 70-
75 and accompanying text (describing history and purpose of Committee of 100 on the Federal
City).
31. See Craig Statement, supra note 22.
32. Committee of 100 on the Federal City, Working Paper on Nelsen Commission Report
(1972) (available in the Martin Luther King Memorial Library, Washingtoniana Collection,
Home Rule Papers).
33. Id.
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editorial sharply criticized the NCPC both as comprehensive planning
agency and as protector of the Federal interest. The Post editorial said:
There are also a number of local citizens and interests, most of
them on the western fringes of the city, who suddenly show great
concern for the federal interest, particularly as represented by the
National Capital Planning Commission, which has often confused
the broad federal interest with narrow and selfish local interests.34
The Washington Star-News raised some of the same concerns. The Star-
News pointed out in an article that the residents of northwest Washington
made much of the NCPC's "independence" but "it is exactly this which has
often given NCPC's plans such an air of abstraction."3 In a direct endorse-
ment of a fresh start for local planning, the Star-News wrote:
And beyond the matter of accountability there is the question of
the kind of planning Washington needs and where it is most likely
to happen.
Washington is a city as well as a capital and it needs a positive
kind of city planning. It needs a kind of planning that makes
things happen and actively shapes the city's future, long-range in
its vision, but responsive to the immediate needs of the city and its
people.36
Although all sides assumed that the NCPC would remain an appointed
body, they disagreed on increased District representation on the Commis-
sion after home rule.37 Prior to home rule, the NCPC was composed of five
"eminent citizens" appointed by the President, only two of whom had to be
from the District of Columbia and surrounding areas and seven ex-officio
members from the Federal and District governments. 38 Under this arrange-
ment, the District government had only one representative out of the twelve
NCPC members.39
B. Congressional Response: District Planning Redefined
The United States Senate sought to continue Federal control of all plan-
ning in the Federal District by refusing to amend the powers or composition
of the NCPC.4 ° Conversely, the House of Representatives strongly favored
34. Wash. Post, June 29, 1973, at A30, col. 1.
35. Canty, supra note 18, at C4, col. 1.
36. Id. at CI, col. 5 and C4, col. 1.
37. HOME RUI.E LEGISIATIVE HISTORY, supra note 9, at 2160, 3069-70, 3093, 3557.
38. National Capital Planning Act, Pub. L. No. 82-592, § 2(b), 66 Stat. 781 (1952).
39. Section 2(b)(2) of the National Capital Planning Act requires one of the D.C. resident
members to be appointed from at least three nominees of the Board of Commissioners of the
District of Columbia. Id.
40. The only proposal regarding the planning functions of the NCPC in the Senate bill
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relinquishing control of the non-Federal aspects of planning to the District
of Columbia. 4 1 The final resolution of this controversy granted the local
government authority over the non-Federal aspects of planning for the first
time in the history of the Nation's Capital. On July 1, 1974, the NCPC's
mandate changed. Under the final provisions of the Home Rule Act, the
NCPC continues as the central planning agency for the Federal Government
in the region, and authority over planning functions for the District of Co-
lumbia is delegated to the Mayor.42 The Act specifically exempts Federal
and international projects and development within the District from the
mayor's authority.4 3
Because the Home Rule Act changed both the mission and the member-
ship" of the NCPC, it redefined planning in the District. The District gov-
ernment is charged with the duty to prepare the "District's elements" of the
comprehensive plan including land use, urban renewal, redevelopment, so-
cial, economic, transportation and population distribution elements, and
public works programs. 45 The residual, non-"District elements" fall under
explicitly prohibits the District City Council from passing any act contrary to the provisions of
the National Capital Planning Act of 1952. See HOME RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 9, at 2912, 2913 n.I. See also S. 1435, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 325(d)(5) (1973). But cf
H.R. 9682, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203(a) (1973).
41. The House proposed granting power over municipal aspects of planning to the Dis-
trict government while allowing the NCPC to retain control over the facets of planning that
impact negatively on the "federal interest." H.R. 9682, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 203(a)(1),
423(a)(1973). See also infra note 46 and accompanying text. Provisions in the House bill
pertaining to the makeup of the NCPC also ensured some degree of local input in the Commis-
sion's Federal planning activities. The House bill provided that two members of the NCPC
would be appointed by the District's chief executive. H.R. 9682, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203(b).
The House, before conferring with the Senate, offered two compromise positions designed to
retain some measure of local control over NCPC activities. Under the so-called NCPC/Dis-
trict proposal, the President could appoint five of the commissioners; one from Maryland, one
from Virginia, and at least two would come from a list submitted by the Commissioner, the
District's chief executive. HOME RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 9, at 2910. Tile
other proposal, the Nelsen-Green proposal, gave the President six appointees; at least one each
from Maryland and Virginia and at least two from the District. Id. at 2912. Of the two
required appointees from the District, at least one had to be chosen from a list of nominees
prepared by the District's chief executive. Id.
42. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-244 to 1-246, 1-2002 (Replacement Volume 1987).
43. Id. § 1-244(a).
44. As of January 2, 1975, three of the citizen members must be appointed by the Presi-
dent and two by the Mayor. Presidential appointees are to include at least one resident of both
Maryland and Virginia, whereas the two mayoral appointees must be residents of the District.
Effective July 1, 1974, the seven ex-officio members became the Secretaries of Defense and the
Interior, the Administrator of General Services, the Mayor and the Council Chairman of the
District of Columbia, and the Chairmen of the Senate and the House Committees on the Dis-
trict of Columbia. NCPC and Home Rule, NCPC Quarterly 2, 3 (Summer 1974).
45. D.C. CoiE ANN. § 1-244(a). The Mayor has primary responsibility for preparing the
plan which must be approved by the City Council. Id. § 1-244(b).
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the jurisdiction of the NCPC, which is required to prepare the comprehen-
sive plan for Federal activities in the National Capital.46 Furthermore, the
Act grants the NCPC veto power over the District elements of the plan if the
Commission finds that these elements impact negatively on the "interests or
functions of the federal establishment."47 While the veto power serves as a
check on the District planning activities, increased District representation
on the NCPC guards, to a certain degree, against arbitrary exercise of Fed-
eral veto authority.
Finally, the Act allows the NCPC to make nonbinding recommendations
to the Zoning Commission on all proposed zoning map or text amend-
ments.48 The NCPC's advisory role in zoning matters extends to making a
determination as to whether the specific proposal comports with the compre-
hensive plan.49 While the NCPC's opinion is not binding upon the Zoning
Commission, it is accorded substantial weight.5° This provision of the Act
ensures that the NCPC will exert influence over both planning and zoning
activities in the District.
In addition to procedures that implicitly force communication between
the District of Columbia land use and planning agencies and their Federal
counterparts, the Act specifically mandates cooperation and collaboration
between these competing spheres of influence.5" Ideally, the procedures
46. Id. § 1-2003(a)(1).
47. The NCPC reviews all aspects of the municipal government's plan. If any element of
the submission conflicts with the Commission's perception of the Federal interest, the NCPC
must certify this finding to the City Council. The City Council may either accept the findings
and resubmit the specific element in accordance with the Commission's recommendations, or
reject the findings and resubmit the element in a modified form. Id. § 1-2002(a)(4)(A),(B). In
either case, if the NCPC rejects the resubmitted version, that element of the plan cannot be
enacted as part of the comprehensive plan. Id. § 1-2002(a)(4)(B),(C). While these procedures
seem cumbersome, they are intended to promote an ongoing dialogue between the Federal and
municipal planning agencies. See id. § 1-2001(a) (Replacement Volume 1987) (general pur-
pose of the provisions of the Act includes promoting "collaboration between federal, state, and
local governments in the interest of equity and constructive action"); see also infra notes 51-52.
48. Both the House and Senate versions of the Act contained provisions requiring the
Zoning Commission to submit proposed zoning amendments to the NCPC for review and
comment. See H.R. 9682, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 492(b) (1974); S. 1495, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 323(a)(1) (1974).
49. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2006(a) (Replacement Volume 1987).
50. The low standard of judicial review accorded zoning decisions magnifies the impor-
tance of the NCPC recommendation. Courts will not overturn an action by the zoning author-
ity unless the findings and conclusions are clearly arbitrary and capricious or not supported by
the evidence. See DuPont Circle Citizen's Ass'n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 355
A.2d 550, 568 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 966 (1976). Therefore, the NCPC's opinion, be-
cause it is part of the record in a zoning case, can serve as the basis for the Zoning Commis-
sion's decision.
51. Pursuant to the Act, the Mayor must establish procedures to foster "meaningful con-
sultation with any State or local government or planning agency in the National Capital region
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built into the Act aim at providing both Federal and local input on aspects
of planning and zoning. 52 The Techworld case tested this elaborate system
of checks and balances, which Congress "painstakingly and carefully" 3
crafted to foster responsible land use policy in the District of Columbia.
II. TECHWORLD: PHYSICAL DESIGN AND LAND ASSEMBLY
Techworld is a mixed-use project currently under construction on a four-
acre site adjacent to the District of Columbia Convention Center. Upon
completion, it will consist of office and showroom space for companies deal-
ing with computers, office automation, and telecommunications.5 4 Ideally,
Techworld will provide a central location for the demonstration of products
and services related to the information industry. 5 Enhanced by Washing-
ton's international character, its developers claim that Techworld will at-
tract buyers and sellers of information technologies and services throughout
the Nation and the world.5 6
As proposed, Techworld will encompass approximately 2,430,000 square
feet of developed space, 960,000 square feet of which will be office and show-
room space. It will contain an 800-room convention hotel, a major confer-
ence center, 70,000 square feet of retail, restaurant and public service
facilities, a museum of modern technology, and garage space for 2,000
cars.57
Simply assembling land for a large development in downtown Washing-
ton's dynamic real estate market can be very difficult. Any property located
between the United States Capitol and the White House is available only at a
high premium. The Techworld project is located directly between the White
House and Capitol Hill.
affected by an aspect of a proposed District element of the comprehensive plan ... affecting or
relating to the District." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-244(a). In addition, the Act encourages the
NCPC to "act in conjunction and cooperation and enter into agreements with any state or
local authority or planning agency .... " Id. § 1-2003(c)(2).
52. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2002(a) (NCPC veto power over local elements of the
comprehensive plan) and D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2006 (NCPC to issue reports and recommen-
dations regarding zoning and subdivision cases) with D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2002(b) (mandating
increased District representation on the NCPC).
53. HOME RULE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 9, at 2886.
54. Northeast Notebook,- Washington; A Showcase Jbr Technology, N.Y. Times, June 26,
1988, § 10, at 25, col. 4.
55. Market Showplace to be Built, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 18, 1985, at 138.
56. In late 1987, Techworld's developer, see infra note 58, stated that it had leased or was
close to reaching terms on over 500,000 square feet of space. Tenants included AT&T, Xerox,
and NCR Corporation. Washington High Tech Trade Center Bucks Odds, COMPUTERWORLD,
Nov. 9, 1987, at 18.
57. See Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 108
(D.D.C. 1986).
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Working quietly between 1979 and 1982, the developer, 58 International
Developers, Incorporated (IDI), assembled most of the land on the block
bounded by K, Eye, Eighth and Ninth Streets for the Techworld project.5 9
Realizing later that one block was insufficient space to achieve its objectives,
the developer contacted land owners in the block east of the proposed site,
between Eighth and Seventh Streets. Through a joint venture arrangement,
the developer gained control of most of that block.6" However, the entire
project remained in doubt without the closing of Eighth Street.6 '
The Techworld site currently covers approximately four acres bounded by
Seventh Street, Ninth Street, K Street, and Eye Street.6 2 It includes 93% of
the ground in Squares 403 and 427, as well as a 35,792 square foot segment
of Eighth Street between Eye and K Streets.6 3 The site is currently zoned C-
4.64 Under regulations applicable to this category, the developer may con-
struct, as a matter of right, buildings on the property with gross square foot-
age of 10 times the lot size if the building is more than 110 feet high.6" Thus,
as planned, Techworld will consist of over 2.5 million square feet of devel-
oped space and related parking facilities.6 6
A. Approval to Build
In order to integrate Eighth Street into Techworld, the developers peti-
tioned the District of Columbia to permanently close the street to traffic and
to transfer the street title to the corporation. The developers intend to con-
58. The main developer of the World Technology Trade Center is International Develop-
ers, Incorporated (IDI). Other developers include Techworld Realty, Inc., Techworld Devel-
opment Corporation, Techworld Hotel Associates, and FF Realty Corporation. IDI is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia. It is a developer and
managing partner of Techworld. In legal papers, the developers are referred to as IDI, et al.
In this study, the term "developer" generally refers to IDI and these terms will be used inter-
changeably. In a few instances, "developer" is used collectively to encompass the entire group.
59. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, Zoning Commission Order No. 461, at 2
(1985) [hereinafter Zoning Commission Order].
60. Among the joint venturers who invested with IDI, a leading local lending institution
put up approximately $15,000,000 in equity financing. Virginia Trade Company Turns Real
Estate Unit Into Profit Center, Am. Banker, Mar. 28, 1989, at 8.
61. Without the Eighth Street closing, IDI could not join buildings on the two parcels
with its proposed sky bridge. See infra note 68; see also D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 199.9
(1987) (definition of building line would prevent a developer from "[extending] a building or
any part of the building" beyond the line dividing public property without special permission,
in the case of the street, from private property).
62. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 2.
63. Id.
64. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 750.1 (1987).
65. Id. § 771.5.
66. Northeast Notebook; Washington; A Showcase for Technology. N.Y. Times, June 26,
1988, § 10, at 25, col. 4.
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vert a portion of Eighth Street running through the middle of the project
into a pedestrian plaza with shops and restaurants." Approximately 75 feet
above this plaza, a five-story span will connect the top five stories of the
main structures, creating one large building.6" Becuase the entire structure
will stand 130 feet high,6 9 however, IDI met with vocal and tenacious oppo-
sition from the time it first unveiled its proposal.
The Committee of 100 on the Federal City, founded in 1923 by Frederick
A. Delano, is the oldest planning organization in the District of Columbia.7"
It was created "to restore and promote sound city planning for Washing-
ton."'" It is dedicated to safeguarding the original street pattern for the city
as embodied in the L'Enfant Plan for the Federal City.7 2 With prodding
from the Committee of 100, Congress, in 1926, established what is now
known as the National Capital Planning Commission as the central planning
agency for both the Federal and District governments.7 3 The Committee of
100 entered the Techworld debate on behalf of its members who sought to
preserve their use and enjoyment of the open streets and vistas in the Na-
tional Capital.74 It alleged that its members would be injured by the closing
of Eighth Street and by the Techworld project because of the adverse effect
that those measures would have on the aesthetics of the area.75
The District of Columbia Preservation League (DCPL), a nonprofit cor-
poration, is dedicated to the protection of the landmarks in the District of
Columbia. 76 Part of its mandate includes protecting the original street pat-
terns in the L'Enfant Plan for the Federal City. 77 As a result, the DCPL
67. Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 108 (D.D.C.
1986).
68. IDI originally planned to connect the top six stories of the buildings, thus placing the
base of the sky bridge sixty-three feet above the ground. Zoning Commission Order, supra
note 59, at 7. However, the developer eliminated the lower span after the Zoning Commission
expressed concern over this aspect of the project. Id. at 7, 27, 33; see also infra notes 115-17.
69. Pursuant to the Height of Buildings Act of 1910, D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-405(a) (Re-
placement Volume 1988), no building in the District may be taller than the sum of the width of
the street on which it fronts plus twenty feet. Techworld fronts on K Street, which is 110 feet
wide at that point, therefore allowing a maximum height of 130 feet. See Zoning Commission
Order, supra note 59, at 17, 24; Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 120-23. The preservationists vigor-
ously contested the calculation on which the court and the Zoning Commission based their
conclusions. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 21; Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 120.
70. Craig Statement, supra note 22, at 230.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See supra note 9.
74. Id.
75. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 20-21.
76. Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 110 (D.D.C.
1986).
77. See, e.g.. Techworld v. L'Enfants World, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29. 1986, § I, at 7, col. 3
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became involved in the Techworld controversy on behalf of members who
alleged injuries similar to those of the members of the Committee of 100.
Members of both organizations claimed to live, work, and spend leisure time
in the vicinity of the proposed project.78
Throughout the Techworld epic,79 some District government officials and
members of the developer's staff sought to discredit these preservationist
groups for their supposed suburban, elitist views.8° Referring to the orienta-
tion of the preservationist groups, District officials and the developers main-
tained that the organizations did not represent or reflect the prevailing
interests of the citizens of the District of Columbia.8 Officials of the DCPL
and the Committee of 100 denied these charges and contended that their
membership merely reflected the organizations' agendas.82
Although residency within or without the official boundaries of the Dis-
trict of Columbia does not conclusively determine the representative charac-
ter of preservationist organizations, an analysis of the membership of both
groups reveals that a majority of the members are District residents. For
example, of the 1553 members of the DCPL, approximately 66.1% reside in
the District, 28.3% live in the Washington suburbs, and 5.6% reside else-
where in the United States.83 The Committee of 100 has a total of 170 mem-
bers, of which more than 75% live in the District of Columbia, 21% reside
(Robert Peck, President of the District of Columbia Preservation League (DCPL), claimed
that Techworld could "sound the death knell" for the L'Enfant plan).
78. While the area around Techworld consists mainly of commercial development, the
project lies in proximity to major employment centers such as the District of Columbia courts
complex, the federal district court, the Capitol Hill area, and several large federal office
buildings.
79. Seven years have elapsed from the time the developer first conceived the project until
the present. See Northeast Notebook; Washington; A Showcase for Technology, N.Y. Times,
June 26, 1988, § 10, at 25, col. 4.
80. Interview with Edward Meyers, Director of Policy, District of Columbia Office of
Intergovernmental Relations, D.C. Government (Aug. 27, 1987).
81. Id.
82. Interview with Emily Durso, Vice President of Marketing, Techworld Corporation
(Sept. 11, 1987); interview with Mike Quinn, Executive Director, District of Columbia Preser-
vation League (Jan. 19, 1988); interview with Dorn C. McGrath, Chairman, Committee of 100
on the Federal City (Mar. 21, 1988).
83. Preservationist Groups
Geographical Distribution of Members
Jurisdiction D.C. Preservation League Committee of 100
Members Percentage Members Percentage
District of Columbia 1,027 66.1 130 76.5
Virginia 230 14.8 18 10.6
Maryland 210 13.5 18 10.6
U.S.A. 86 5.6 4 2.3
Total 1.553 100.0 170 100.0
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in the Washington suburbs, and 2.3% come from other parts of the
country.84
These organizations remained "dogged opponents" of Techworld
throughout the entire process of administrative review of the project. When
all of their efforts failed, both groups kept their promise to take legal action
to stop the project.85
The preservationists' efforts centered on the developer's plan to close
Eighth Street between Eye and K Streets.86 The United States Government
held title to Eighth Street,87 and IDI filed an application to close the street
with the city surveyor.88 Pursuant to regulations promulgated under the
Street and Alley Closing and Acquisition Procedures Act of 1982 (the Street
Closing Act),8 9 the surveyor solicited comments from the NCPC, the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB), the fire and police de-
partments, the Office of Planning, the Department of Planning and
Community Development, and the Department of Environmental Serv-
ices. 9° With the exception of the HPRB, each agency recommended ap-
proval of the application with some modifications. 9'
Following these reviews, the Committee on Public Works of the Council
of the District of Columbia considered the proposal.92 On September 26,
1984, the Public Works Committee submitted its final report that, in recom-
mending the closing of Eighth Street, declared that Techworld would have
"a positive fiscal impact" on the District economy. 93 In recommending ap-
proval, the Committee endorsed a list of proposed restrictions the reviewing
Table 1. Statistics used to compile this chart were obtained and are available from the
Committee of 100 and the DCPL.
84. Id.
85. Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 110 (D.D.C.
1986).
86. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
87. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 111. The government, therefore, argued that the Eighth
Street Closing Acts were acts concerning Federal Government property within the meaning of
the Home Rule Act's prohibition and, consequently, were void.
88. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 1401.1 (1985).
89. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-411 to 7-435 (Supp. 1988); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 1401.
90. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, §§ 1401.2-.15, 1402. There is no specific restriction on
the surveyor's ability to solicit additional comments. Nor do the regulations require review of
the application by each of the agencies.
91. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 109.
92. Id.; see also D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, §§ 1403-1405 (1985) (procedures for the sur-
veyor's transmittal of agency recommendations to the Council and notice requirements attach-
ing to Council action).
93. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 109; see Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 9, 10
(Techworld is projected to produce over 6,000 permanent jobs and direct annual tax benefits to
the District of over $15,000,000).
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agencies had suggested.94 These conditions reflected the reviewing agencies'
desire to limit the impact of the closing on the public welfare. 9" Specifically,
the Public Works Committee reviewed and approved conditions requiring
the developer to: (1) grant the city a permanent easement for emergency
vehicles;96 (2) grant a 45,000 square foot easement for pedestrian circula-
tion;97 (3) grant another easement to preserve the view along Eighth Street
from the Carnegie Library to the Museum of American Arts/National Por-
trait Gallery; 98 (4) commit to the basic components of the development;99
and (5) install a sprinkler system throughout the project."
The proposal, thus approved, proceeded to consideration by the full City
Council. In November 1984, the Council voted unanimously to close Eighth
Street and to transfer title to the developer.101 The Council originally ap-
proved the closing and transfer of title in emergency legislation 10 2 passed on
November 7, 1984.103 Permanent legislation was approved on November
29, 1984.104 The final language of the act conditioned transfer on the devel-
oper's execution and recordation of the five Public Works Committee cove-
nants.'1 5 The developer had previously complied with this requirement on
November 16, 1984.106 As required by the Home Rule Act, the Mayor for-
94. While the Council possesses broad authority to close streets and alleys, see D.C. CODE
ANN. § 7-421 (if the Council deems the specific thoroughfare "unnecessary for street or alley
purposes" it may use its closing power), the individual Council members are not experts quali-
fied to assess the precise ramifications of a specific closing. By farming out the street and alley
closing applications to various agencies of the District and Federal governments, the Council,
through the Surveyor's office, fills this vacuum of knowledge. See, e.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit.
24, § 1401.2(a) (the Director of the Department of Environmental Services reviews the appli-
cation to determine if the closing will adversely affect sewer and water facilities and solid waste
collection). As with zoning decisions, the scope of judicial review is effectively narrowed. Cf
Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S.E. 674 (1926) (no injunctive remedy available against
city council to prevent a legislatively authorized street closing).
95. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 1401.2 (the impact of a closing on the public welfare is
a function of the effect it will have on available public facilities).
96. D.C. Act No. 5-212, § 3(b), 31 D.C. Reg. 6419, 6419-21 (1984).
97. Id.
98. Id.
)9. Id.
100. Id.
101. D.C. Act No. 5-212, 31 D.C. Reg. at 6422.
102. Emergency acts take effect immediately and remain in effect for 90 days. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-229(a) (Replacement Volume 1987). Such measures require a two-thirds majority
vote by the Council. Id. Therefore, the Council effectively closed Eighth Street upon passing
D.C. Act No. 5-206, 31 D.C. Reg. 5984 (1984).
103. D.C. Act No. 5-206, 31 D.C. Reg. at 5987.
104. D.C. Act No. 5-212, 31 D.C. Reg. at 6421.
105. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 8.
106. See Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 109
(D.D.C. 1986).
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warded the measure to both houses of Congress for a mandatory thirty-day
review period."°7 Congress failed to exercise its power, and the legislation
became law on December 29, 1984.
The approval process for the project lasted over eighteen months. During
this time, several agencies, including the Zoning Commission,10 8  the
NCPC,'0 9 the Fine Arts Commission," 0 the HPRB,"' and the City Coun-
cil's Committee on Public Works" 12 held public hearings on the proposal.
The agencies then recommended approval and suggested several limitations
and conditions, which were designed to ensure that the street closing and the
project as a whole would be advantageous to the city. The developer repeat-
edly changed and modified the project to address the concerns of the review-
ing bodies.' 13
B. Emerging Issues
While the Eighth Street closing application was pending, the developer
forged ahead with rezoning and planned unit development (PUD) applica-
tions." 4 Both the NCPC and the Zoning Commission rejected the initial
107. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a) (Replacement Volume 1987). All permanent legislation
passed by the District Council must be sent to the United States Congress for a 30-day review
period before it effectively becomes law. Id. § 1-233(c)(1).
108. The Zoning Commission did not review the application to close Eighth Street. It
became involved at the second stage of the proceedings when the developer sought to rezone
the property and gain approval for a planned unit development (PUD) application. See gener-
ally D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-412(e), 5-413 to 5-414 (Replacement Volume 1988) (Zoning Com-
mission is empowered to enact zoning maps and regulations and amendments thereto; all
amendments must be "not inconsistent" with the comprehensive plan); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit.
11, § 2400 (1984) (purpose of PUDs); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (regarding
comprehensive planning under the Home Rule Act).
109. The NCPC reviewed the application for the closing of Eighth Street. See Zoning
Commission Order, supra note 59, at 17-18; Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 109. Further, the
NCPC exercised its right to review the rezoning and PUD application and make a nonbinding
recommendation. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2006 (Replacement Volume 1987).
110. The Fine Arts Commission (FAC) reviewed only the rezoning and PUD application.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-410 (Replacement Volume 1988). It is unclear whether the FAC
recommended denial of the rezoning and PUD submission. See Zoning Commission Order,
supra note 59, at 18 (FAC expressed "concern" over the project).
111. The Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB) recommended denial of the Eighth
Street closing. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 109. The Zoning Commission's decision approving
the rezoning and PUD application makes no mention of the HPRB's recommendation on that
submission. However, the Zoning Commission concluded that the project would not denigrate
the historic L'Enfant Plan. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 23-24.
112. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 109.
113. IDI submitted two fully-developed alternative designs for Techworld. Zoning Com-
mission Order, supra note 59, at 3. Additionally, the developer also submitted numerous "al-
ternative schemes." Id. at 7.
114. In the District of Columbia, the Zoning Commission hears and decides such applica-
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tions. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-413 (Replacement Volume 1988); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11,
§ 102.3 (1984). The Zoning Commission assigns zoning classifications through the promulga-
tion of zoning regulations which delineate the various zones and describe the uses permitted in
each. See generally D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 105.1 (1984) (use districts or zones described).
It applies these general provisions to specific properties in the city through the official zoning
map, which is incorporated by reference into the zoning regulations. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit.
11, §§ 106.7, 107.1 (1984) (the zoning map shall show the boundaries of the zoning districts).
A property owner may apply to the Zoning Commission to change the zoning classification
applicable to his property. Id. § 102.2(a). Such applications, if granted, constitute amend-
ments to the official zoning map. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-414 (Replacement Volume 1988).
Property owners seek such amendments in cases where their plans for the use of the property
do not coincide with the uses permitted as a matter of right in the current zoning classification.
A rezoning reassigns or expands the uses permitted as a matter of right. In making such
amendments, the action of the Zoning Commission shall not be "inconsistent with the compre-
hensive plan" and generally shall be designed to, inter alia, "promote the health and general
welfare" of the citizens of the District. Id. The Zoning Commission must follow specific
procedures in all rezoning cases. See generally D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, §§ 106, 3000-3099
(1984).
In addition to standard rezonings described above, a property owner may seek to have his
development designated as a planned unit development. Id. §§ 2400, 2404. Ideally, PUDs
allow "greater flexibility in planning and design than may be possible under conventional zon-
ing procedures . I..." d  § 2400.5. Pursuant to the PUD regulations, the developer agrees to
submit to a two-phase review process, id. § 2402, whereby the Zoning Commission and the
Office of Planning scrutinize the proposal. Id. § 2405. Given the detailed information that the
applicant must submit as part of this process, these procedures allow the Zoning Commission
to shape specific aspects of the development such as design, location of structures, architec-
tural elevations, and landscaping. Id. § 2404 (application requirements); see also id. §§ 2405.8,
2406.6 (the Zoning Commission may modify or attach conditions to the approval of any PUD
application).
In return for ceding this control to the Zoning Commission, the developer may obtain the
right to construct its project at a density beyond that normally allowed in the zoning classifica-
tion applicable to the property. Id. § 2403.10 (1984); see also id. § 199.9 (1987) (definition of
floor area ratio). The Zoning Commission may also allow the developer to exceed the height
limitations generally applicable in the underlying zoning category. Id. § 2403.4. In order to
gain these advantages, the applicant must demonstrate that public benefits and other "merito-
rious aspects" will result from the construction of the project as submitted. Id. §§ 2403.4,
2403.10.
In contrast to these procedures, where a property owner decides to develop without PUD
approval, land use and construction must conform strictly to the regulations and uses applica-
ble in the pertinent zoning category. Id. § 101.5 (1984). In such cases, the developer loses the
opportunity to realize height and density increases, and the city loses much of its ability to
shape the specifics of the project. See generally Kransnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A
Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 47
(1965); 5 P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 32.01 (1978).
In the Techworld case, IDI sought both a rezoning and PUD approval. The property was
originally split-zoned HR/C-3-C and C-3-C. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 2.
The HR/C-3-C category is a commercial zone to which special regulations apply; these are
designed to promote the development of hotel facilities on the properties so designated. See
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, §§ 105.1(d)(3)(C), 1100-1199 (1984). Without the "HR" designa-
tion, the C-3-C zone generally allows "high bulk" major business and employment centers.
Id. § 105.1(d)(3)(C). IDI sought approval for a rezoning to the C-4 category. Zoning Com-
mission Order, supra note 59, at 2. The C-4 zone was designed to allow various commercial
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Techworld design submitted in the spring of 1984. 15 The Zoning Commis-
sion cited concerns that the project was, perhaps, too big and poorly
designed. 116 At that stage in the proceedings, it was particularly concerned
about the "massive" bridge spanning Eighth Street.' However, the NCPC
and the Zoning Commission ultimately agreed that the project's design re-
garding Eighth Street did not substantially impair the vista the preservation-
ists sought to protect. ' 8
These conclusions ran contrary to the NCPC staff recommendations.' 9
The NCPC staff maintained that while the revised plan represented an im-
provement over the original, it did not address its most serious concerns. 2 o
The staff recommended denial of the plan because the bridge spanning
Eighth Street would block the landmark vista between the Carnegie Library
in Mount Vernon Square and the National Portrait Gallery.' 2 ' The staff
also stated that the project's proposed 130-foot height violated District of
Columbia law.' 2 2 It further noted that Techworld's size would literally and
figuratively overshadow Mount Vernon Square.
12 3
These comments reflected the preservationist groups' testimony at hear-
ings before the NCPC. During NCPC hearings in November 1984, an archi-
tectural historian from the Smithsonian Institution and representatives of
the Committee of 100 in the Federal City and the District of Columbia Pres-
retail and business uses. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 750.2 (1984). Through the PUD applica-
tions, IDI sought to increase the density and height limits normally applicable in the C-4 zone.
Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 6.
115. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 7, 27.
116. See IDI Prepares More Techworld Design Work After Zoning Commission Victory,
Bus. REV., Mar. 18, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
117. After IDI submitted its first set of plans, the Zoning Commission worried that the
project maintained insufficient set backs from Seventh, Ninth, and Eye Streets. Zoning Com-
mission Order, supra note 59, at 27. The Zoning Commission also expressed concerns regard-
ing the set back of roof structures, the lowest level of the space across Eighth Street, and the
overall "vertical versus horizontal appearance of the facade and reduction of the appearance of
the bridge." Id. These concerns vanished upon IDI's submission of its revised proposal. Id.
at 27-28. See also infra note 118.
118. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 22-23, 29. The revised plan narrowed
the Eighth Street thoroughfare from 100 to 60 feet. Id. at 23, 29.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
120. NCPC Votes Approval of Techworld Project, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1984, at Fl, col. 4.
121. Id. at F12, col. 1.
122. Id.; Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 120-23
(D.D.C. 1986). Probably the first mention of potential legal action against the project came at
the November 1984 meeting on the revised Techworld proposal when the Deputy Mayor for
Economic Development (representing the Mayor) said that the District of Columbia Corpora-
tion Counsel supported the developer's calculation of a 130 foot height. The NCPC staff re-
acted by noting that the allowable height of the building might have to be decided by the
courts.
123. NCPC Votes Approval of Techworld Project, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1984, at F12, col. 1.
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ervation League expressed fears that the proposed span, the narrowing of
Eighth Street, and the massive structure in general would seriously reduce
the scope and quality of the historic vista along the street. 1
24
In recommending denial, the NCPC staff equated the Federal interest
with the historic Eighth Street vista. 1 25 Yet, in spite of the staff recommen-
dation, in late November 1984, the NCPC voted seven to four to approve
what had become an intensely controversial proposal.' 26 The NCPC vote
included an approval of the requested rezoning and the PUD application.'
27
Philosophical differences split the Commission. 2 ' The cleavage among
the members revolved around divergent perceptions of what constituted the
Federal interest within the context of the project being considered. ' 29 While
the NCPC was bound to protect the Federal interest in planning decisions
affecting the National Capital region, 3 0 its members possessed different con-
ceptions of this charge. Some members viewed the Eighth Street vista in a
historic context, emphasizing the original design of Pierre L'Enfant and fo-
cusing on the architectural splendor and aesthetic ambience of the Capital
City."3 ' Other members of NCPC purportedly accepted the full importance
of the L'Enfant vista. They, however, recognized the overriding importance
of supporting and nurturing development in the downtown area.132
Faced with these divergent views, the Commission's resolution of ap-
proval took a distinctively Solomon-like approach. The NCPC adopted a
statement saying that it approved the project with " 'appropriate height and
bulk modifications.'" The NCPC, however, failed to specify the modifica-
124. Id. at F12, cols. 1-2.
125. Id. at F1, col. 4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at F12, col. 2. Some members of the NCPC felt that the Zoning Commission was
the appropriate body to consider the potential economic benefits of the project.
The Executive Director of the NCPC, however, argued strenuously for adoption of the staff
recommendation. In his view, the protection of the Federal interest in the context of
Techworld was inextricably tied to the L'Enfant plan. Current economic conditions and rein-
terpretations of supposedly established goals and designs held only secondary importance.
Emphasizing the importance of the NCPC charge, the Executive Director stated: "If this were
on any street but Eighth Street it might be acceptable, but this street is very special. We've got
to be as strong as we can on the issue of the federal interest." Id.
Commissioner Helen Scharf expanded on this view: "The NCPC is the only agency in
Washington called on to protect the federal interest .... I fear we will be obligating commis-
sion members who will follow us if we decide this issue on something other than the federal
interest." Id. Joining Scharf in opposition were the Commissioners from General Services
Administration, the Department of the Interior, and the United States Senate. Id.
129. Id. at Fl, col. 4.
130. Id.
131. Id. at F12, col. 1.
132. Id.
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tions it considered appropriate. 33 It probably expected the zoning process
to define the appropriate modifications. Actually, the NCPC statement of
approval was no more than an endorsement of the Deputy Mayor for Eco-
nomic Development Curtis McClinton's pro-development stance.134 Deputy
Mayor McClinton had defended the project, including the proposed bridge
over Eighth Street, and stated that Techworld required the open, continuous
floor space that the span would create. 135 He further expressed belief that
the project would bring needed business to the District's Convention
Center. 136 By endorsing the proposal, the NCPC showed support for the
Mayor's efforts to bring jobs to the city by championing a project that could
act as a catalyst for development in that part of the city. 137
While the City Council of the District of Columbia is not bound by the
recommendation of the NCPC in deciding a rezoning petition, 38 the NCPC
report can be a key factor in the Council's deliberations. 139 The Eighth
Street Closing Act, in some respects, presaged the division voiced at the
NCPC hearing on the rezoning. While it approved the closing, the Eighth
Street closing legislation conditioned the approval on the developer's prom-
ise to maintain the view along Eighth Street.' 4 ° Therefore, the conditional
approval reflected the Council's attempt to placate the developer and the
District government by granting the closing, while simultaneously seeking to
appease preservationists by restricting the project's encroachment into
L'Enfant's prized vista.
C The Planned Unit Development Application:
Submission and Withdrawal
Following the City Council's approval of the Eighth Street closing, the
Zoning Commission considered the rezoning and PUD application."'4 This
application received substantial attention throughout the remainder of the
Techworld controversy. Charges and counter-charges centered on the filing
of the PUD application, the response from the Zoning Commission, and the
subsequent withdrawal of the application. 4 2
133. Id. at F1, col. 4.
134. Id.
135. Id. at F12, col. I.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2006 (Replacement Volume 1987). See supra note 50 and ac-
companying text.
139. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
140. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 13, 18.
141. Id. at 22-26.
142. See supra notes 114, 116-17 and accompanying text.
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From the outset, the Zoning Commission expressed reservations about the
project's proposed architectural design and strongly suggested a change. 14 3
The developer sought to comply with the Zoning Commission's many sug-
gestions.' 44 After numerous public hearings that consumed fifty hours,'45
many revisions, and a completely new design, the Zoning Commission fi-
nally granted the PUD application, subject to thirty-seven conditions.'46 In
particular, it would allow the proposed design only if the developer agreed to
restrict the project to those trademart uses that supposedly necessitated the
design. The Zoning Commission specifically found that:
much of the building [must] be used as a trademart. . . .If the
project were not a trademart, the connecting bridge and other ele-
ments of the design would not be necessary. Accordingly, if any
use other than a trademart is proposed for the designated por-
tion ... as limited by this order, approval of the Zoning Commis-
sion will be required.' 47
The "designated portion" constituted roughly one-third of Techworld,
which was restricted for perpetual use as a trade center. Other restrictions
required the developer to commit to strict ratios of show room, display, and
office space. 148
The Zoning Commission acted despite charges by the opposition that
trademarts in other cities were not as successful as originally anticipated,
and that if the project failed as a technology mart, it could become just an-
other office building.' 49 The Zoning Commission apparently sought insur-
ance against these predictions"' by requiring that Techworld could be
occupied only by high-technology trademart tenants."' The developer
found this condition particularly onerous because it interfered with efforts to
obtain financing.' 5 2 Lenders were unwilling to finance a project in which
143. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 1, 26.
144. Id.
145. IDI Prepares More Techworld Design Work After Zoning Commission Victory, Bus.
REV., Mar. 18, 1985, § 1, at 35, col. 1.
146. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 30-35.
147. Id. at 30.
148. Id.
149. No Guarantee on Techworld, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 1985, (Wash. Bus. sec.), at 1, col. I
& 23, col. 3.
150. The Zoning Commission pointed out that IDI was not legally bound to prove the
economic feasibility of the project. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 25.
151. Id.
152. Techworld Architect Cecchi Seeks Concessions from City, Wash. Bus. J., Aug. 5, 1985,
at 2, col. 3. IDI initially denied that this was the reason for abandoning the PUD proposal.
Later, the developer admitted that lender delays were threatening the project's bottom line, but
insisted that the PUD application was withdrawn because the conditions "restricted the flexi-
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leasing flexibility was restricted indefinitely into the future.'5 3
The developer returned to the Zoning Commission seeking relief from this
rigid requirement.' 54 Negotiations continued but the Zoning Commission
stood firm, finding that the evidence did not justify approval of the project
without the restrictions imposed.' 55 During the street closing procedures,
the developer repeatedly referred to its plan to apply for PUD approval for
the site.' 5 6 However, in August 1985, IDI announced that it would with-
draw its PUD request and develop the project under existing zoning regula-
tions."' As a result, the conditions delineated in the PUD approval no
longer bound the developer.' 58 By proceeding to develop pursuant to the
existing zoning regulations, the development was governed by standards al-
ready contained in the zoning code.'5 9
Many officials involved in the street closing process expressed the view
that, by withdrawing its PUD application, the developer repudiated
promises made to obtain the Eighth Street closing.' 60 After rejecting the
developer's request to remove the conditions, Zoning Commission Chairwo-
man Maybelle T. Bennett, a supporter of the project, said: "I feel betrayed.
I want something like this to work. But as far as I'm concerned, we've al-
ready given away the company store. '"161
The developer responded to these charges by countering that conditions
limiting uses within the project compelled it to abandon the PUD applica-
tion. '62 Despite scores of contrary representations made during the previous
year, IDI expressed confidence in the viability of the Techworld concept
under the matter-of-right development. The developer, through its presi-
bility required for the successful development of the project." Tech Center Scaled Back, Engi-
neering News Rec., Aug. 22, 1985, at 15.
153. Bredemeier, Techworld Seeks Easing of Conditions: City Asked to Drop Trade Center
Proviso, Wash. Post, July 28, 1985, at Cl, col. I.
154. Bredemeier, Panel Cool to Techworld Concessions: D.C. Zoning Commission Rejects
Most of Cecchi's Demands, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 1985, at BI, col. 3.
155. Bredemeier, Techworld to be Built: Size Reduced to Skirt Zoning Limits, Wash. Post,
Aug. 10, 1985, at GI, col. I.
156. Id. at G5, col. 1.
157. Id. at GI, col. I.
158. Cf D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 2405.11 (1984) (if a developer fails to exercise rights
granted in a PUD approval, the property reverts to its "preexisting condition"). See also supra
note 114.
159. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 101.5 (1984).
160. Members of the Zoning Commission voiced "irritation and anger" at IDI's request.
Bredemeier, supra note 154, at B1, col. 5. Commissioner John G. Parsons stated: "It's gim-
mie, gimmie, gimmie." Id.
161. Id.
162. Bredemeier, supra note 155.
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dent, declared that "[we] didn't ask them to impose such conditions."' 63
The president of the company clearly blamed the Zoning Commission and
stated: "They're pushing me to [use] matter-of-right [zoning] .... If that's
what they make me do, I'll do it. The project is going ahead."' 164
D. Mayor Barry and Economic Development
Mayor Marion S. Barry's endorsement of and enthusiastic support for
Techworld was closely linked with his desire to promote economic develop-
ment in the District of Columbia.' 65 Downtown revitalization has been a
centerpiece of the Barry administration.' 66 Early in his tenure, the Mayor
sought to develop strong ties with the business community as a part of his
plan to inject new life in the downtown area while simultaneously expanding
the job market. 67
It would have been impossible for the developer to successfully navigate
the labyrinthian approval process without the Mayor's support.168 IDI rep-
resentatives met with the Mayor in late 1983 to launch the Techworld pro-
ject. 169 This meeting resulted in a memorandum from the developer
detailing the discussion. In order to realize the benefits from this "unique
and exciting" project, the developer made it clear to the Mayor that IDI
required assistance from his office in several areas, including:
1. gaining approval for the Eighth Street closing;
2. allowing for the construction of buildings up to 130 feet in
height;
3. gaining approval for both the PUD and rezoning applications;
4. gaining approval for the exclusion of the southeast corner of
Square 427 from the proposed Downtown Historic District, if that
District is nominated to the National Register of Historic Places;
and
5. gaining approval for closing of all public alleys in Square
163. Bredemeier, supra note 154, at B5, col. 6.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 176-79.
167. See, e.g., $20 Million District Building Renovation. Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1986, at BI,
col. 1; Business Giving Big to Barry Bid, Wash. Post, Jun. 13, 1986, at B6, col. 1. In his 1986
State of the District address, the Mayor stated:
Economic development has always been one of my highest priorities, because Wash-
ington's success depends on a strong and healthy business community. We have
19,000 businesses in this city. Six out of every ten jobs are in the private sector. And
when I say business, I mean jobs.
Marion S. Barry, Jr. State of the District Address (1986).
168. Techworld Timetable Moved Up, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 1983, at C8, col. 3.
169. ld.
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403.170
In return for his support, the Mayor required commitments from the de-
veloper with respect to jobs, employment, training, and overall economic
development.' 7 1 IDI agreed to participate in the "First Source Employ-
ment" program in the city and to encourage Techworld tenants to do like-
wise. 172 It was also agreed that special priority in the program would be
given to persons living near the project. 173 Further, the developer gave as-
surances that qualified minority-owned firms would receive fair and equal
access to business opportunities created by Techworld.174 In line with the
Mayor's emphasis on job training, the developer further agreed to initiate
and support a training program for entry level employment at Techworld,
promising to work with local universities and the public school system in
designing and implementing this program.'
75
At this early stage, few, if any, of the later hurdles and obstacles could be
anticipated. At a press conference on December 9, 1983, Mayor Barry,
joined by several city officials and business leaders, announced IDI's plans
for development.' 7 6 The Mayor promised full support of the project."' In
his remarks, Mayor Barry hailed the project as "testimony to the positive
effect [of] the convention center."'' 78 The Mayor also thought that the pro-
ject would encourage further development east of 15th Street Northwest, in
the vicinity of the Convention Center.' 79 Mayor Barry summed up his en-
thusiasm for the project by saying: "Any Mayor would welcome this kind of
Christmas present to his city.' 8
0
So long as IDI intended to proceed with the PUD proposal, the Mayor's
support was vitally important, due to the composition of the NCPC. Four
members of the Commission were aligned with the Mayor directly, and an-
other, the Chairman of the House Committee on the District of Columbia,
consistently supported the Mayor's position on land use issues. 181 It was no
170. Memorandum from Linowes & Blocher to Marion S. Barry, Jr. (June 22, 1983).
171. Zoning Commission Order, supra note 59, at 9-10, 34.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 34.
176. High-Tech Trade Center Planned, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 1983, at C8, col. 2, C9, col. 2.
177. Id. at C9.
178. Id.
179. Id. As a member of the pre-home rule District of Columbia Council, Mayor Barry
had been a prime mover in winning congressional approval to build the center.
180. Techworld Timetable Moved Up, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 1983, at C8, col. 3.
181. The mayor appoints two members of the Commission. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2002(b)
(Replacement Volume 1987). Additionally, the mayor and chairman of the City Council sit as
ex officio members. Id.
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coincidence that in both the street closing vote and the PUD recommenda-
tion, these commissioners supported the Techworld development. 82 After
the Eighth Street closing and IDI's withdrawal of its PUD application, the
Mayor put forth a valiant effort to settle the conflict between the developer
and the preservationists. A number of attempts at negotiation failed," s3
making it clear that legal action could not be avoided.
III. THE LEGAL BATTLE
The District of Columbia Preservation League and the Committee of 100
on the Federal City are both preservation organizations concerned with the
protection of landmarks and the historic character of the District of Colum-
bia. In October of 1985, they wrote to the Regional Director of the Depart-
ment of the Interior's National Capital Region, arguing that the Eighth
Street Closing Acts were an unlawful appropriation of United States prop-
erty."'84 Their letter demanded that the Department of the Interior immedi-
ately move to reclaim the street, and threatened a mandamus action if the
Department refused. 185 The preservationists also persistently threatened the
developers and the District of Columbia government officials with legal ac-
tion to halt the development of Techworld.18 6
Three months later, their demands still unmet, the preservationists filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against IDI, Mayor Marion Barry, the Dis-
trict Council, several District of Columbia officials, and the NCPC.18 7 The
preservationists also sued the Department of the Interior for mandamus re-
lief.'88 On the same day, IDI brought an action against the District of Co-
lumbia Preservation League, the Committee of 100 on the Federal City, and
the District of Columbia, seeking a declaration as to the legality of the trans-
182. Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 109 (D.D.C.
1986); see also Eighth Street Closing Acts, 31 D.C. Reg. 5984-87 (1984); NCPC Votes Approval
of Techworld Project, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1984, at Fl, col. 4.
183. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 110.
184. Id.; see also Letter from D.C. Preservation League and Committee of 100 on the Fed-
eral City to Manus J. Fish, Junior Regional Director, National Capitol Region, Department of
the Interior (Oct. 30, 1985).
185. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 110.
186. Id.; see also Complaint of Techworld Development Corporation for Declaratory Re-
lief at 12, 60, D.C. Preservation League v. International Dev., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 106
(D.D.C. 1986) (C.A. No. 86-0266) [hereinafter Developers' Complaint].
187. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 110; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, D.C. Preservation League v. International Dev., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1986)
(C.A. No. 86-0266) [hereinafter Preservationists' Complaint].
188. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 110.
[Vol. 38:599
Conflicting Vistas In The Nation's Capital
fer of the Eighth Street property. 89
Responding to the mandamus petition,190 the United States Department
of Justice filed a quiet title action with respect to the Eighth Street property
on behalf of the Department of the Interior, the Smithsonian Institution, and
the NCPC. 19 ' The Justice Department also asked that IDI be required to
shave twenty feet from the planned height of the two square block project.192
While some viewed the entrance of the United States Government into the
case as a challenge to home rule, the government instead emphasized that
the issue was the preservation of Pierre L'Enfant's city street plan.' 93 Later,
the preservationists consented to dismissal of the mandamus action, and the
quiet title action was consolidated with the other two actions.194
The preservationists and the Federal Government set out numerous sub-
stantive and procedural arguments attacking the validity of the closing and
bridging of Eighth Street as well as the proposed development of the sur-
rounding property. Initially, the preservationists argued that the District
Council acted beyond the authority the Home Rule Act 19 5 granted to it
when it purportedly ceded the Eighth Street tract to the developers under
the Eighth Street Closing Acts. They claimed that Congress had reserved
this power to itself.' 96 Alternatively, the preservationists argued that even if
the District Council did act in accordance with the will of Congress, the
Home Rule Act represented an unconstitutional delegation of authority to
District officials under the appointments clause of the United States Consti-
tution.197 Next, the preservationists argued that the enactment of the Eighth
Street Closing Acts was itself flawed for failing to meet the procedural re-
quirements of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).' 9s They
also claimed that even if the transfer to the developers was proper, the devel-
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 110. See United States Complaint for Quiet Title Action,
United States v. Techworld Hotel Assoc., 648 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1986) (C.A. No. 86-0837)
[hereinafter United States Quiet Title Complaint].
192. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 120. See United States Quiet Title Complaint, supra note
191, at 12, e.
193. United States Quiet Title Complaint, supra note 191, at 6, 1 16.
194. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 110.
195. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of title I D.C.
CODE ANN. ch. 2). The Home Rule Act provides greater autonomy to the District of Colum-
bia government to act with respect to matters not implicating Federal or congressional con-
cerns or interests. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-201(a) (Replacement Volume 1987). See supra
text accompanying notes 40-47.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 203-20.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 221-35.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 244-53.
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opers could only complete the project if they agreed to abide by an implied
covenant to proceed as a PUD. 19 9 Additionally, because the Eighth Street
vista"° was an historic landmark, the preservationists claimed that all previ-
ously granted excavation permits issued in connection with Techworld were
illegal for failing to conform with District of Columbia historic preservation
legislation. Moreover, the preservationists contended that all future permits
would have to comply with these procedures.2 °1 Finally, the preservation-
ists argued that the proposed 130 foot height of Techworld violated the Dis-
trict of Columbia Height of Buildings Act.2" 2 The following section of this
Article will outline the district court's analysis and rejection of each of these
arguments.
A. Local Authority to Close Federally Owned Streets
Under the Home Rule Act
Although the city had been closing streets for over half a century,20 3 the
United States lawsuit challenged the District government's authority to close
those streets falling within the original L'Enfant city plan, which includes all
of downtown Washington.2 "4 Specifically, the Home Rule Act prohibits the
District government from "enact[ing] any act ... which concerns the func-
tions or property of the United States."205 Therefore, the preservationists
argued that because the Eighth Street property was Federal property within
the meaning of the Home Rule Act, the District government had over-
stepped its authority when it transferred the property to the developers
under the Eighth Street Closing Acts.206 Because the transfer was beyond
the Council's power, it was completely void.20 7
The court's inquiry was whether Congress intended to abrogate the Dis-
199. See infra text accompanying notes 236-43.
200. The "vista" comprised the view south on Eighth Street from the Carnegie Library to
the National Archives and was registered in the District of Columbia Inventory of Historic
Sites. Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106, 123 (D.D.C.
1986); see also Preservationists' Complaint, supra note 187, at 27, 29.
201. See infra text accompanying notes 270-79.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 254-69.
203. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 111; see also Street Readjustment Act of 1932, 47 Stat.
747, ch. 4 (1932) (formerly codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-401 to 7-410, repealed by Street
and Alley Closing and Acquisition Procedures Act of 1982, D.C. Law 4-201, § 726, 30 D.C.
Reg. 148 (1983)(codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-411 to 7-472 (Supp. 1988))).
204. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 111-12; see also Van Ness v. City of Washington, 29 U.S.
(4 Pet.) 232 (1830).
205. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(3) (Replacement Volume 1987).
206. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 110; see also Street and Alley Closing and Acquisition
Procedures Act of 1982, D.C. CoDiE ANN. § 7-421.
207. Techworld 648 F. Supp. at 112.
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trict's power to close streets when it enacted section 1-233(a)(3) of the Home
Rule Act. The court examined the history of the congressionally-delegated
street closing power in the District. Congress first expressly delegated the
power to the District government in 1932.208 Each time Congress reorga-
nized the structure of the District government, the power to close streets was
passed on to the reorganized District government, along with all other previ-
ously held powers.2 °9
The court also looked to the purpose of the Home Rule Act. It concluded
that the Act was intended to further free Congress from the onus of adminis-
tering the local concerns of the District by giving the District government
most of the powers of other municipalities.2 1 ° Congress retrieving the street
closing power from the District would achieve a result in direct conflict with
the Act's stated purpose. Thus, the court concluded that it would be ludi-
crous to read an isolated section of the legislation in a manner contrary to
the stated purpose of the Act.2 1' The fact that the power was not expressly
excepted from the inherited powers, coupled with the "paradigmatically lo-
cal" interests affected by a street closing, provided strong evidence that the
District did have the authority to close federally owned streets.
All permanent legislation passed by the District of Columbia Council
must be reviewed by Congress.2 12 As additional evidence of Congress' intent
that the District of Columbia Council should have the power to close streets,
the court noted that not only had Congress reviewed and not vetoed the
Eighth Street Closing Acts, but Congress also failed to veto a District statute
changing the street closing procedures.2 13 This latter statute is premised on
the assumption that the District has the power to close streets and alleys."1 4
The court concluded that if Congress wanted to circumscribe the District's
authority to close streets, it would have done so in the context of one of these
208. Id. See Street Readjustment Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 747, ch. 4 (1932).
209. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 113. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, § 402(168),
81 Stat. 948, 961 (1967).
210. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 113-14; see also supra note 195.
211. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 113.
212. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(1) (Replacement Volume 1987). Congress has 30
days to review the action and veto acts passed by the Council before the Council action be-
comes law. Id. However, when two-thirds of the Council deem that an act must be immedi-
ately effective because of an emergency, the act takes effect immediately, but for no more than
ninety days. See id. § 1-229; see also supra text accompanying note 107.
213. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 114-15. Street and Alley Closing and Acquisition Proce-
dures Act of 1982, D.C. Law 4-201, § 726, 30 D.C. Reg. 148 (1983) (codified as amended at
D.C. CODE- ANN. §§ 7-411 to 7-472). See also supra text accompanying note 107.
214. See D.C. CoDE ANN. § 7-421; see also District of Columbia Appropriation Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 101(d), 100 Stat. 3341-180 to 3341-194 (1986).
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acts by exercising its veto authority.21 5
The court concluded that section 1-233(a)(3) of the Home Rule Act,
which prohibited District legislation concerning federal functions or prop-
erty, was intended to " 'safeguard the operations of the [F]ederal
[G]overnment on the national level.' ,,216 Therefore, section 1-233 would
prohibit District legislation concerning Federal property of "national signifi-
cance" or "used by the United States in connection with federal governmen-
tal functions. "217 Legislation concerning the national monuments or
Federal buildings was not authorized by the Home Rule Act. Essentially,
the government argued that the L'Enfant plan was just as much a monu-
ment and national treasure as the Washington Monument or the White
House.2 t8 Because it was of "national significance," the Eighth Street vista
contemplated in the L'Enfant plan was the kind of property protected from
District council legislation by section 1-233(a)(3). Unimpressed by this ar-
gument, the court instead characterized the Eighth Street property as "a
small street in [n]orthwest Washington, '2 19 not as a component of the
L'Enfant plan. The court, therefore, concluded that the street alone did not
rise to the level of "national significance" and was not beyond the reach of
District Council legislation.22 °
B. The Appointments Clause Challenge
The preservationists next argued that even if Congress intended to dele-
gate the street closing authority to the City Council, the delegation of au-
thority was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of separation of
powers under the appointments clause of the United States Constitution.2 21
The appointments clause 2 2 2 provides that officers of the United States must
be nominated by the President and that the Senate must confirm certain
high-ranking presidential nominees. 223 The preservationists argued that the
closing of Eighth Street constituted the exercise of "significant federal au-
thority pursuant to the laws of the United States ' 224 which constitutionally
215. See Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 114.
216. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Cent. Labor Coun., AFL-
CIO, 442 A.2d 110 (D.C. 1982)).
217. Id. at 115.
218. Id. at 114-15; see also United States Reply to Motion in Opposition to United States
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 7-9, Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League,
648 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1986) (C.A. No. 86-0252).
219. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 115.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
223. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 115 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. cl. 2).
224. Id.
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may be exercised only by an officer appointed by the President.2 2 There-
fore, the preservationists reasoned that the exercise of the street closing au-
thority by the City Council (authorized by Congress under the Home Rule
Act) was an unconstitutional infringement of executive authority.22 6
The court distinguished the delegation of street closing authority under
the Home Rule Act from the delegation of authority resulting from the exec-
utive appointment involved in Buckley v. Valeo,227 a case upon which the
preservationists relied. InBuckley, Congress reserved to itself the power to
appoint certain members of the Federal Election Commission, whose mem-
bers "exercised executive authority, specifically 'enforcement power, exem-
plified by . . . discretionary power to seek judicial relief.' ,228 The United
States Supreme Court determined that the delegation of certain administra-
tive functions of the Commissioners violated the appointments clause of the
United States Constitution at the expense of maintaining the separation of
powers. 229 Here, the City Council was exercising authority delegated to it
by Congress in an area where the Constitution gives Congress plenary au-
thority to act. 231 "As Congress can pass the Eighth Street Closing Acts it-
self, the [a]ppointments [c]lause does not forbid it from allowing the City
Council to pass it, subject to congressional review.",231
Additionally, the court concluded that because Congress may legislate for
the District, the passing of the 1932 Street Closing Act 232 was really a mu-
nicipal act, as opposed to a national act, and therefore not an exercise of
Federal power.233 Because it was not an exercise of Federal power, the dele-
gation of authority to close streets, and the subsequent exercise of that au-
thority by the City Council, did not implicate the appointments clause at
all.2 34 Therefore, no unconstitutional breach of the separation of powers
principle was possible in this case.2 35
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
228. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 115 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138 (emphasis added)).
229. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 141, 143.
230. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 115-16. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, which
provides in part: "The Congress shall have Power .... To exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over [the District of Columbia] ... and to exercise like Authority over all
Places purchased . . . for the erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other
needful Buildings." Id.
231. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 116.
232. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
233. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 116-17.
234. Id. at 117.
235. See id. at 116.
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C. The Implied Covenant to Proceed as a Planned Unit Development
The plaintiffs also challenged the propriety of the developer's decision to
forego PUD zoning. 36 Preservationists argued that the City Council's deci-
sion to transfer the Eighth Street property was made conditional on the de-
veloper's willingness to file and comply with five separate covenants
governing the use of the property.137 The preservationists, moreover, argued
that the decision was also made in reliance on the developer's representation
that it would proceed under PUD zoning control.2 38 This representation,
argued the preservationists, amounted to an implied covenant to proceed as
a PUD, and the developer's decision to withdraw from the PUD process
subsequent to receiving the deed to the Eighth Street property resulted in a
violation of that implied covenant.2 39
The court rejected this argument. It noted that the City Office of Plan-
ning, in its recommendation to the City Council with respect to the Eighth
Street closing and transfer, initially suggested that the closing should be con-
ditioned on PUD approval."4 The court concluded that because the City
Council imposed five other conditions on the closing and expressly rejected
the PUD approval requirement after full consideration, it had not intended
to condition its street closing and transfer approval on PUD status.2 4 '
Moreover, as a general rule, no developer is required to proceed with a pro-
ject as a PUD.242 If the Council had intended to create an exception and
require PUD approval for Techworld, the court concluded it would have
clearly expressed this intent.243
236. See supra notes 114, 155-58 and accompanying text (detailing developer's fallback to
matter-of-right zoning). By proceeding under matter-of-right zoning, the developer was freed
from the costs and the building restrictions PUD related hearings would have produced. See
Preservationists' Complaint, supra note 187, at 32, 115.
237. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 117. See also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
238. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 117.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 118.
241. Id. The court also noted that the Mayor and the Council argued that no such cove-
nant was intended. Id. at 117. The court misconstrues the importance of the Council's intent
at the time of the closing. An implied covenant is one that arises not from the intent of the
parties, but to avoid an unjust enrichment. The parties need not intend to form a binding
commitment in order for the implied covenant to arise. Thus, the intent of the parties is not
dispositive. Rather, the question is one of unjust enrichment. The court did not consider
whether the preservationists had standing to claim an unjust enrichment by the developer
where the city claimed no loss or detriment. Yet, even if the court had decided that the
preservationists had standing, there might not have been a change in the result.
242. See id. at 118; see also supra note 114 (discussing the PUD process).
243. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 118.
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D. The National Historic Preservation Act and the Role of the NCPC
Preservationists also argued that even if the District government had the
authority to close and transfer the Eighth Street property, the exercise of
that authority was void for failure to comply with the procedures of the
National Historic Preservation Act.24 4 The NHPA245 requires that the Ad-
visory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) be allowed to recommend
to any Federal agency involved in an "undertaking" that affects historic ar-
eas. 246 The National Capital Planning Commission was the only Federal
agency involved in the Eighth Street closing.2 47 Although the NCPC's only
role in the Techworld planning process was to provide the City Council with
a nonbinding recommendation 24' regarding the street closing, the ACHP
was not given an opportunity to comment to the NCPC. Thus, if the Eighth
Street closing was a "federal undertaking" within the meaning of the statute,
the closing procedures were flawed.
The court looked to the NHPA itself and found that the role of the NCPC
did not rise to the level of an "undertaking. ' 24 9 An undertaking exists
"where a federal agency has direct or indirect control of a project involving
the expenditure of federal funds, or the issuance of a federal license." 25" The
court cited examples of Federal involvement that amounted to "undertak-
ings" as "projects directly undertaken by the agency, projects supported by
federal loans or contracts, projects licensed by the agency, or projects pro-
posed by the federal agency for congressional funding or authorization. '"251
Here, the only Federal involvement was the provision of a non-binding rec-
ommendation. The NCPC itself did not believe that its limited role created
an "undertaking., 2512 Thus, the court concluded that the Eighth Street clos-
ing was not a "federal undertaking," and, therefore, the relevant provisions
of the NHPA were not triggered by the NCPC's involvement in
Techworld. 2 "
244. Id. at 119.
245. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470W-6 (1982 and Supp. IV
1986).
246. Id. § 470f.
247. See supra text accompanying note 90.
248. See Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 119.
249. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1982); see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(o) (1988).
250. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 119.
251. Id. at 120; see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(o).
252. See Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 119.
253. Id. at 120.
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E. The Building Height Limitation Act
The Height of Buildings Act of 1910 (HBA)2 54 regulates the height of
buildings in the District of Columbia. The HBA provides that buildings
may have a maximum height equal to the width of the street on which they
front, plus an additional twenty feet.2 55 Where a building fronts on a public
space at the intersection of two or more streets, the height of the building is
limited to the sum of twenty feet plus the width of the widest street.25 6 Both
preservationists and developers sought a court declaration of the maximum
permissible height for Techworld.2 57
The court initially noted that the interpretation and application of the
HBA was within the province of the District of Columbia Corporation
Counsel. Because the Corporation Counsel had already issued an opinion
letter approving a 130 foot height for Techworld, the court concluded that it
was appropriate to show substantial deference to that finding. The court
would overturn the Corporation Counsel's approval only if the preservation-
ists could show that the Corporation Counsel's decision was "plainly unrea-
sonable or contrary to legislative intent." '2 58
The Corporation Counsel based its opinion letter finding that K Street was
no less than 110 feet wide on the conclusion of the District of Columbia
surveyor.259 The surveyor, in turn, based its conclusion on an examination
of the King Plats, drafted by Nicholas King, the first surveyor of the Dis-
trict, in 1803.260 The surveyor's finding also reflected an administrative
practice of including in the width of a street, the width of any public space
(for example, a traffic circle or square) adjoining it.26 ' Thus, the width of K
254. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-405(a) (Replacement Volume 1988).
255. See id.; see also Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 120; supra note 69.
256. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-405(a).
257. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 120. The Corporation Counsel for the District of Colum-
bia also argued that the preservationists had no standing to contest the approved height of the
project because the Corporation Counsel had sole authority to prosecute this claim. Id. The
court agreed that there was no private right of action under the HBA and that the preserva-
tionists had no standing. However, because'the Federal Government owned property adjoin-
ing the Techworld site that the height of the project would adversely affect (Mt. Vernon
Square), it had proper standing to sue. Id. at 120-21.
258. Id. at 121 (citing Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1983); Williams v. Washington Metro. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
259. Id. at 122.
260. The court also rejected a government challenge to the accuracy of the plats. Id.
Although jurisdiction over certain public areas has changed since their drafting, the court held
that the plats still represented the "definitive survey of the District of Columbia", that the
dimensions they reflected were accurate, and that the Corporation Counsel and the D.C. Sur-
veyor could reasonably rely on them in drafting opinions. Id.
261. Id. at 121.
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Street, for the purposes of determining the maximum permissible height for
Techworld, included the width of the abutting Mount Vernon Square.2 62
The government did not challenge this administrative practice. Instead, it
unsuccessfully attacked the underlying validity of the opinion as well as the
underlying accuracy of the King Plats. 63
The Corporation Counsel determined that a 130 foot height was also per-
missible under the special maximum height formulation of section 5-405(a),
which applies in situations where a building fronts on a public space formed
at the intersection of two streets, provided that the public space did not "in-
terrupt the course" of the streets.2 64 The maximum height of buildings
meeting these requirements is calculated from the width of the widest
street.26 5 The D.C. Surveyor's opinion recited that Mount Vernon Square
did not interrupt the respective courses266 of K Street, New York Avenue,
and Massachusetts Avenue, because each street had the same compass head-
ing both entering and leaving the Square.2 67
The government argued that the project interrupted the course of each of
these streets because their respective directions changed in that the streets
circumnavigated the square and did not pass through it. For this reason, the
special "widest street" rule did not apply.2 68 Reiterating the substantial def-
erence standard, the court rejected the government's argument, characteriz-
ing it as a mere "alternative interpretation" of the statute, insufficient to
overturn the Corporation Counsel's otherwise reasonable interpretation.2 6 9
262. Id.
263. The United States also attacked the opinion itself. Id. at 122. It argued that a law
firm retained by the developer actually drafted the opinion issued by the Corporation Counsel.
It presented exhibits showing a draft opinion addressed to the District of Columbia surveyor
from the Corporation Counsel. The draft opinion appeared on the stationary of the devel-
oper's retained law firm and was obtained from its files. See United States Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, at 15, Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Preservation League, 648 F. Supp. 106
(D.D.C. 1986) (C.A. No. 86-0252). The government argued that there was an obvious conflict
of interest in the preparation of the opinion and that the opinion was "not entitled to any
weight as an administrative interpretation of the [HBA]." Id. at 15-16. The court rejected the
attack, stating that who initially prepared the opinion was irrelevant. Once the Corporation
Counsel adopted the opinion, "it became the official position of the City." Techworld, 648 F.
Supp. at 122.
264. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-405(a) (Replacement Volume 1988). A building fronting onto a
public space "[flormed at the intersection of 2 or more streets .... the course of which is not
interrupted by said public space . . . ,the limit of height of the building shall be determined
from the width of the widest street . Id.
265. Id.
266. "Course" in this context refers to the direction or compass heading of the street.
Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 122.
267. Id. at 122-23.
268. Id. at 123.
269. Id. The outcome on this issue, and perhaps its true basis, was foreshadowed when the
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F The Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act Challenge
The preservationists' final argument alleged that the procedures used by
the Mayor in issuing the excavation permit for Techworld were flawed be-
cause the Mayor failed to allow the District of Columbia Historic Preserva-
tion Review Board (DCHPRB) to comment on the permit applications as
required by the Historic Landmark and Historical District Protection Act
(HLHDPA) 7° Like the National Historic Preservation Act,27 ' the
HLHDPA requires a comment period by an independent historical preserva-
tion committee before the city may take action altering an historic
landmark. 72 The landmarks to which the HLHDPA applies are listed in
the District of Columbia Inventory of Historic Sites.2 73  Among the
landmarks listed therein is the "Eighth Street Vista from Mt. Vernon Square
to National Archives. ' 274
Conceding that the excavation already completed would not alter this
vista, the preservationists sought a declaration that all future building permit
applications would be entitled to and would receive this comment.2 75 The
court summarily rejected the preservationists' argument because, although
listed in the Inventory, the vista described in the Inventory did not in fact
exist. Interrupting the view between Mount Vernon Square and the Na-
tional Archives is the Old Patent Office Building.2 76 Noting that the cre-
ators of the Inventory "were not always able to exercise a constant degree of
care," 277 and without even trying to resolve the ambiguity created by the
inaccurate listing, 278 the court concluded that there was no vista. Therefore,
the HLHDPA comment provisions did not apply to Techworld. 79
court noted that if the Corporation Counsel's method of interpreting the statute were rejected,
at least three other large buildings in the District would be in violation of the HBA. See id.
270. Id.; see D.C. Law 2-144, § 2, 25 D.C. Reg. 6939 (1979) (codified at D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-1001 to 5-1015 (Replacement Volume 1988)).
271. 16 U.S.C. § 470-470W-6 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
272. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1005(b).
273. D.C. Preservation League, Historic Districts in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 1986 & 1987
Update).
274. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 123.
275. Id.
276. The Old Patent Office Building has been converted into the National Portrait Gallery
and the Museum of American Art.
277. Techworld, 648 F. Supp. at 124.
278. The preservationists argued unsuccessfully that, inasmuch as the Inventory was cre-
ated by a group of capable historical experts, the listing in the Inventory must refer to some-
thing. See id.
279. Id.
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G. The Decision and Threat of Appeal
The court delivered its opinion on August 5, 1986. It rejected all argu-
ments made by the opponents of Techworld and confirmed the propriety of
the Eighth Street closing and transfer. Reacting to the decision, the devel-
oper complained of substantial financial losses incurred during the months of
delay. He was, however, pleased that the court cleared the way for construc-
tion to begin on the project." 8 in contrast, some of the representatives of
the preservationists and the government expected to lose at the district court
level, but were prepared to appeal the decision and were optimistic about
their chances of winning the next round.2 8" ' The immediate question they
faced was whether to try to negotiate concessions from the developer or to
move forward immediately with the appeal. The developer and the District
government did not have long to savor their victory as the likelihood of
appeal became increasingly clear.
IV. MAKING THE RUN TO THE HILL
The future of the Techworld project remained in limbo for approximately
two months. Further negotiations on concessions and the threat of appeal
persisted. After consultations with District officials within the offices of the
Mayor, Council Chairman, and Corporation Counsel, the developer looked
to Capitol Hill for insurance against further legal action by opponents of the
project. Congressional action would bring permanent closure to the matter.
The developer's overtures toward Capitol Hill met with resistance from
District officials, especially Council Chairman David Clarke, who saw the
move as undermining home rule. Chairman Clarke was concerned that a
precedent would be set requiring affirmative action by Congress where a par-
ticular power delegated to the District of Columbia pursuant to the Home
Rule Act was challenged.2" 2 Clarke and other officials did not share the
developer's apprehension over the preservationists and Federal Govern-
ment's decision to appeal.2 83 The provisions of the Home Rule Act concern-
ing the power of the District government to close streets and alleys could
stand on their own merit. There was no need to avoid appellate review.
Furthermore, District officials were wary of any congressional language
that referred specifically to the closing of Eighth Street. They preferred gen-
280. La Franiere, Judge Clears Way for Construction of Techworld, Wash. Post, Aug. 6,
1986, at B3, col. 1.
281. Interview with Robert A. Peck, President, D.C. Preservation League, in Washington,
D.C. (Sept. 18, 1987).
282. Sherwood, Techworld Encounters New Woes, Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 1986, at C5, col. 6.
283. Id.
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
eral language that would reaffirm or restate the District's authority to close
streets and alleys under the Home Rule Act.284 But when preservationists
filed their appeal on September 25, 1986, and Congress prepared to adjourn,
the developer perceived an urgent need for action, lest the Techworld project
be lost altogether. 85 According to the developer, the cost of the delays in-
volved in waiting out the appeal process would be prohibitive.286 Beyond
registering their concerns, District officials took no affirmative steps to fore-
stall congressional action.
Tapping his political contacts on Capitol Hill, and faced with at least ac-
quiescence from the local government officials, the developer sought a joint
resolution from Congress to reaffirm the city's action to close Eighth Street
and the alleys. Working mainly through members of the Virginia delegation
in Congress (Senators John Warner (R) and Paul Trible (R), Representative
Stan Parris (R)), and Delegate Walter Fauntroy (D-D.C.), the developer in-
tensified his efforts to obtain passage of this special legislation.287 Congress-
man Parris introduced House Joint Resolution 738 in the House of
Representatives co-sponsored by Delegate Fauntroy. 28s This represented
one of the few times these members of Congress agreed on a District of
Columbia issue. The District's fiscal year 1987 appropriations bill included
a rider concerning Techworld that was attached during the final hours of the
appropriations debate.289
District officials acquiesced to the use of terminology specifying the
Eighth Street closing after the congressional sponsors of the resolution
promised that legislation reaffirming the general authority of the District
government to close streets and alleys under the Home Rule Act would be
introduced in the next (100th) Congress. 290 With a flip-flop of position by
Senator Warner, who initially appeared to be an obstacle to congressional
action, Congress passed the following resolution:
The Congress of the United States reaffirms the authority of the
Council of the District of Columbia, as authorized by the Street
and Alley Closing and Acquisition Procedures Act of 1982 (D.C.
Code, sec. 7-421), to enact the Closing of a Portion of 8th Street,
Northwest, and Public Alleys in Square 403 Act of 1984 (D.C.
284. Id.
285. Interview with Emily Durso, Vice President of Marketing, Techworld Corporation, in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11, 1987).
286. Mintz, Techworld Set for Construction, Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1986, at AI, col. 1.
287. Techworld Encounters New Woes, Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 1986, at C5, col. 3.
288. H.R.J. Res. 738, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
289. Id. § 101(d).
290. Memorandum from Richard W. Clark, Intergovernmental Liaison Officer, Council of
the District of Columbia, to all Council Members (Dec. 16, 1984).
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Law 5-148), and the Closing of a Portion of 8th Street, Northwest,
and Public Alleys and Square 403 Emergency Act of 1984 (D.C.
Act 5-206).29i
The promised legislation reaffirming the District's authority to close streets,
however, was not introduced in the 100th Congress.
The Techworld controversy came to an end with the passage of House
Joint Resolution 738. It was clear to all parties involved that the action by
the District government authorizing construction of Techworld would stand
in spite of an appeal. The final chapter in this protracted conflict consisted
simply of wrap-up negotiations between the opponents in the litigation.
An agreement between the developer, the Department of the Interior, and
the preservationists to allow the stalled project to go forward resulted in the
dismissal of the appeal of the district court ruling in the United States Court
of Appeals.2 92 In return, the developer agreed to reduce further the size of
the project.29 3 The parties agreed that the bridge over Eighth Street would
connect the top four stories of the complex instead of the top five floors
(originally six) as planned.2 94 This adjustment allowed a broader vista of the
National Portrait Gallery down Eighth Street from the Carnegie Library at
Mt. Vernon Square. In addition, the agreement specified that the building
must be set back from K Street five feet more than originally planned.2 95
The developer also agreed to spend $100,000 to install sidewalks and trees
on Eighth Street. 29 6 Finally, Mayor Barry agreed to write a letter to the
preservationists stating that the city's earlier decision to allow the bridge
over Eighth Street was considered an extraordinary action and was not "pre-
cedent-setting."297
V. CONCLUSION
During the current home rule era, numerous conflicts of interest arose
between the Federal Government and the government of the District of Co-
lumbia, covering a wide range of policy areas such as land use, public safety,
revenue and finance, public works, and personnel. Of these areas, land use
remains at the cutting edge of these unsettled relations. For example, one of
only two District statutes officially vetoed by Congress, the Location of
Chanceries Act of 1979, involved land use. This Article's case study of
291. H.R.J. Res. 738, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
292. Mintz, supra note 286.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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Techworld manifests the continued collisions between federal and local in-
terests with respect to land use control. While most of these conflicts be-
tween the two jurisdictions have involved interventions by the national
government through the appropriations process, some of the land use policy
cases, such as Techworld, have provided a judicial remedy as a means of
settlement. In these types of conflicts, the local government has fared better
when challenging the superior powers of the national government.
In effect, the Techworld controversy centered around a conflict between
the national executive branch and local interests. Congress, the usual inter-
venor in District affairs, did not become involved officially in the legal con-
flict, and when it finally entered the case, it sided with the local government.
Congress' policy action seemingly originated from the parochial interests of
the congressional delegations of a state bordering the Nation's Capital.
There is no evidence that the rank and file members cared much about the
conflict or its outcome.
The Rowat thesis, which asserts that there is a natural conflict of interests
between the national government and the people who live in a federal capital
city, raises potent questions. However, the thesis, presently conceptualized,
is too general to serve as a useful research guide. While the thesis assumes
that conflicts of interest result from the assertion of legitimate national inter-
ests, many of the conflicts that our National Government has engaged in
have non-national origins. Research suggests that a more complex set of
underlying causes creates the conflicts regarding the District. Federal inter-
ventions have more often represented the assertion of parochial interests
rather than an assertion of legitimate national interests. For example, two
types of parochial interests are evident in the Techworld case: First, individ-
ual state or regional interests of those jurisdictions bordering on the Federal
District, and second, interests of internal local groups such as the preserva-
tionists and local unions that use the Federal Government as an appeals
board when their efforts prove unsuccessful with the District government.
The prime movers in the Techworld case were the internal local groups:
the DCPL and the Committee of 100. Influential members of these groups
placed a great deal of pressure on the Federal Government to respond to the
closing of Eighth Street and the obstruction of a Pierre L'Enfant vista. The
internal local groups eventually pursued legal action not only against the
local officials and the developers, but also against the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior and the NCPC, a federal agency.
With regard to the split between the executive branch and Congress in the
Techworld case, the executive agencies apparently assigned little importance
to this case. Agency interest appeared mainly at the middle level rather than
[Vol. 38:599
Conflicting Vistas In The Nation's Capital
through top executives, such as Attorney General Edwin Meese and Secre-
tary of the Interior Donald Hodel. Our analysis did not reveal strong Fed-
eral interest in this controversy. Had there been some interest, even by the
executive branch alone, Congress probably would not have entered the case
on the side of the local government and the developer. More accurately,
Congress merely seemed willing to rubber-stamp parochial concerns. Con-
gressmen who do not have a strong interest in most of the District's matters
provide ample opportunities to legislators who do.
In Techworld, the local government was victorious in what resulted in a
tepid collision between federal and local interests. However, as a result of
being bifurcated, the case did not present a clear test of the conflict of inter-
est thesis. Therefore, this analysis concludes that the Rowat thesis needs
some refinement. Not surprisingly, local interests and desires for self-gov-
ernment conflict with federal goals. Some conflicts between governments
with shared jurisdictions are inevitable, a fact demonstrated by the relation-
ship between our National and State governments. Questions arise, how-
ever, over which issues intensify the federal capital conflict and the reasons
why conflict occurs more in some sectors than others. Moreover, it is impos-
sible to determine which interests will prevail when conflict occurs.
The basic problem rests upon the definitions of Federal and local interests
in the nation's Capital. Federal and local interests have become so inter-
twined over the years, that clearly defining or separating them is virtually
impossible. Borderline cases, such as Techworld, present the most serious
problems. Both the Federal and local governments endorsed economic de-
velopment and historical architectural preservation, but assigned the vistas
significantly different degrees of priority. When controversies present clear
Federal interests and clear, necessary solutions, the Federal Government has
ample means to intervene swiftly and decisively.
Finally, the most disturbing aspect of this analysis is our finding that the
Federal Government too often intervenes in District affairs for reasons other
than protection of a national interest. As a result, the local government loses
control over non-national matters. The fact that at least part of the District
government supported the Techworld action is insufficient to justify Federal
intrusion. The local government should settle local matters. Overall,
Techworld makes a strong case for additional statutory protection of legiti-
mate Federal interests and a reduction of intrusions into primarily local
matters.
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